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Forecasts tor the primary commodity market by the Bank's
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but not excessive adaptation to spot-price movements - prob-
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Forecasts of primary commodity prices, which  * The division's forecasts tend to show
the Bank's Intemational Commodity Markets  positive forecast errors - overestimating future
Division has been preparing for more than two  spot prices.
decades, are used mainly for project evaluation
and balance-of-payments projections for devel-  *  Among the expectations models estimated,
oping countries. There has been some concem  the adaptive expectations model appears to
about their accuracy.  Until very recently, the  describe the division's forecast behavior most
majority of studies of both survey expectations  closely.
and futures prices, including previous retrospec-
tive studies of the division's price forecasts,  * The division's forecasts are stabilizing,
found that expectations are formed irrationally  whatever the expectations model used.  There are
and inefficiently. Lately, however, attempts  no indications of "bandwagon" behavior.
have bcen made to explain the sources of fore-
cast biases to put the irrationality of expectations  * The division's forecasts are far from static
in question.  since they put much less weight on current spot
prices than other expectations data - they are
Choe takes a new look at these forecasts in  not as adaptive as others to the latest price
light of recent theoretical and empirical work on  changes.
the formation of expectations. The forecast data
analyzed are one year-ahcad forecasts made for  * The rationality of the division's forecasts
10 commodity prices over the 1979-88 period.  cannot be rejected.
His main findings are:
The  PRE  W.'orking  Paper  Scriec  disseminates  the rindings of work under  way in the  Bank's Policy.  Rcscarch,  and  Extemal
Affairs Complex.  An objectivc  of the  scrics  is to get  these  findings  out  quickly, even  if presentations  arc  less  than  fully
polished.  Thc findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  in thcsc  papers  do not  necessarily  rcpresent  official Bank  policy.
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For  more than two decades, the Internatior.al  Commodity Markets
Division  (CM) of  the  World  Bank  h-as  been  forecasting  primary
commodity prices. The forecasts have been used mainly for project
evaluation  and  balance-of-payments  projections  for  developing
countries. As a part of the institution's planning framework, the
accuracy of the forecasts  has been a  matter of great concern. Thus,
several retrospective  studies of  the past forecast  performance  have
been attempted, such as Castelli et al.  (1985) and Warr  (1988).
Their main conclusions were that the CM forecasts are biased and
are  informationally  inefficient  --  forecast errors  show  serial
correlation  because  the  forecasters  tend  to  adhere  to  their
previous forecasts.
Recently, there has been a rapidly  growing body of theoretical
and  empirical  literature  on  expectations  formation.  On  the
empirical side, investigations  have focused on direct observations
on  expectations  obtained  from  surveys  as  well  as  market
expectations contained in futures  prices. Until very recently, the
majority of studies of both survey expectations and futures prices
found results similar to those of Castelli et al. and Warr --  i.e.,
expectations are probably formed irrationally. See, for example,
Brown  and  Maital  (1981), Hansen  and  Hodrick  (1980), Friedman
(1986),  and Frankel and Froot (1987),  to name only a  few. However,
evidence to the contrary has begun to emerge. Lewis (1989) finds
that  systematic  forecast errors  in  forward exchange  rates  are
mostly attributable to slow adaptation to regime change. Dokko and
Edelstein (1989) find it difficult to reject the hypothesis that
expectations are  formed  rationally  in the  Livingston  survey  of
stock price expectations when the change  from the base level  is
redefined and recalculated.
The main purpose of this paper is to take a new look at the
CM price forecasts in light of these recent investigations. The CM
forecasts are similar in nature to the survey expectations in that
both  solicit  market  experts'  opinions  about  future  price
developments.  However,  there  are  important  differences:  CM
forecasts  are more of the consensus-type forecasts than survey data
and deal with physical goods that are subject to different risks
and constraints. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to see
whether the expectational behavior  implied by the  CM  forecasts
differs significantly from that of survey expectations analyzed by
Frankel and Froot, for example. Furthermore, it is important to
find the sources of  forecast biases, if any, perhaps along  the
lines suggested by Lewis and by Dokko and Edelstein.
In the next section, the characteristics of the CM forecasts
are  reviewed  in  relation  to  the  futures  prices  of  the  same
commodities.  An  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  CM
forecasts and futures prices will be the subject of another paper.
Section .!II  estimates  the alternative  expectational  models. Section
1IV tests the rationality of the expectational behavior. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. DATA AND AN OVERVIEW
A. Data
The International Commodity  Markets Division of the World Bz,r.k
nas been forecasting the prices of many primary commodities over
the last two decades. From the late 1970s, the forecast interval
has been regular; every two years, forecasts are made for the short
term (one  to two years ahead) and for tn1e  long term (10-15  years),
with an extensive reassessment of the global market balance. These
forecasts are revised every six months, primarily focusing on the
short-term outlook. For the purpose of this study, only the short-
term  forecasts made  during  the 1979-88 period  are analyzed.  At
around the middle of each year, forecasts were made of the average
price expected to prevail in  the following year. Thus, the forecast
horizon is about a year. The choice of the data period and forecast
horizon was constrained by the availability of the corresponding
futures prices used in a related study.'  Because of the limited
availability of futures prices, only the following 10 commodities
could be included in  this study --  aluminum, copper, sugar, coffee,
cocoa, maize, cotton, wheat, soybeans, and crude oil.
B. Forecasts vs. Actual Changaes
Table 1 lists the data in the form of percentage changes. Let
p.  denote the logarithm of the spot price at time t, and Etpt+l  be
the logarithm of the spot price expected to prevail in t+l on the
basis of information available in t. Then, the percentage change
in the spot price  expected to take place between t  and  t+1  is
measured by Etpt+ 1 - pt;  the actual percentage change is defined by
Pt+1  - Pt- Summary  statistics  of the  data  are  shown  in Table  2.
The  following  observations  from Tables  1  and  2  are  worth
noting.  First,  the  extreme volatility  of commodity  prices  is
shown by high percentage changes in the actual as well as forecast
prices.  Table 2 shows that standard deviations of both the forecast
and  actual  price  changes  are  high  compared  with  the  mean.
Furthermore,  actual  price  changes  often  turned  out  t- be  much
greater than the forecasts --  standard deviations of actual price
changes are often more than twice those of the forecasts. Secondly,
1 The  futures price data were retrieved  from the commodity
database (DRICOM)  of Data Resources Inc. For each CM forecast, the
matching  futures  price  is  the  average  price  of  all  futures
contracts  maturing  in  the  target  year  of  the  price  forecast,
observed during the week when the forecast was made.
2the actual price changes over the 1980-88 period  appear to have
been more or less random; the cases of actual price increases and
Ceclines are divided about equally (42  against 48). However, there
is  a  clear  pattern  over  time  --  the  actual  prices  generally
increased in 1980,  declined in 1981-82,  increased in 1983, declined
in 1984-86, and increased in 1987-88. On the other hand, the CM
forecasts have been expecting more price increases than declines
(71 against 19). Table 2 shows that the means of the forecasted
percentage changes are all positive and larger in absolute terms
Table 1: CM Forecasts vs. Actuals
(percent  per annum)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
CM lorecasts
Aluminum  -7.1  2.3  42.9  58.9  5.4  21.6  20.8  10.1 -10.9
Copper  -11.4  7.5  40.0  52.8  30.6  14.7  4.5  10.9 -15.8
Sugar  35.4 -68.6  22.0  68.3  11.4  45.3  40.5  42.7  62.6
Coffee  -11.5  15.6  16.2  0.3  5.8  2.8  6.5  -8.2  23.6
Cocoa  11.3  30.7  18.6  15.0  -4.4 -10.8  -9.9  3.9  -0.9
Maize  35.0  15.2  22.3  11.5  5.5  -2.9  -2.6  34.3  17.8
Cotton  18.8  -0.9  19.1  20.5  7.4  13.5  14.6  28.2 -10.5
Wheat  29.5  7.1  7.6  13.9  11.3  10.2  -8.6 -14.8  21.0
Soybeans  -12.4  4.3  24.0  16.6  13.8  8.8  9.8  0.5  10.1
Crude Oil  -15.7  7.3  13.8  5.b  5.8  6.4  2.3  60.9  5.6
Actual Price Movements
Aluminum  4.3 -24.9 -20.5  39.2 -14.6 -11.8  16.2  25.7  35.5
Copper  3.8 -16.1 -13.9  20.3 -21.1  5.7  -7.1  28.3  39.3
Sugar  130.1 -87.1 -66.3  21.3 -70.2  1.1  64.2  20.0  59.6
Coffee  12.0  -0.7  20.8  -6.7  11.7  0.0  36.4 -41.5  29.8
Cocoa  -22.3 -10.5  4.7  31.3  4.3 -12.1  -6.5  -1.5 -23.9
Maize  10.9  -6.6 -22.1  16.8  -3.6 -21.6 -26.8  -8.8  39.6
Cotton  22.3 -15.9 -17.2  10.2  -8.6 -22.9 -23.4  68.7 -31.1
Wheat  26.9 -10.6 -12.9  5.4  -1.2  9.1  -4.8 -17.7  37.3
Soybeans  -1.3 -16.6 -17.2  10.5  7.0 -15.3  -7.0  3.3  34.6
Crude Oil  49.5  7.3 -10.4 -13.3  -2.9  -1.9 -64.4  68.2 -27.5
Note: The years shown are the target years of forecasts.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
3Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of
Forecast fnd Actual Percentage Changes
CM Forecasts  _Actual  Prices
Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
Deviation  DeviatiQn-
Aluminun  16.0  22.9  5.4  24.7
Copper  14.9  22.7  4.4  21.1
Sugar  28.9  40.6  8.1  72.3
Coffee  5.7  11.5  6.9  23.1
Cocoa  5.9  14.0  -4.1  16.7
Maize  15.1  14.0  -2.5  21.6
Cotton  12.3  11.9  -2.0  31.5
Wheat  8.6  13.6  3.5  18.5
Soybeans  8.4  10.4  -0.2  16.7
Crude oil  9.7  20.8  0.5  39.3
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
than the actual changes. The overprediction occurred mostly during
1981-82 and 1984-86  when commodity prices were depressed. Thirdly,
the CM forecasts had about a 50/50 chance of correctly predicting
the  direction  of  actual price  changes;  the  sign was  correctly
predicted in 43 out of 90 cases. Again, most of the errors were
made  during  the  years  of  low  commodity  prices.  As  expected,
commodities with lower standard deviation generally had a better
forecast record. A notable exception to this has been sugar which
has the highest price volatility, but the direction of its price
change was correctly forecasted in seven out of nine times.
C. Forecast Bias: A Comparison
A simple test of the rational expectations hypothesis is the
test  of  unconditional  bias.  As  a  first  step,  we  look  at  the
unconditional biases  of the CM  forecasts and compare them  with
those  of  futures prices.  The  rational  expectations  hypothesis
states that the agents use efficiently all available information
to make  forecasts of the  future variable. Under  the additional
assumption that the agents know the structure that determines the
variable and the probability distribution of the relevant economic
disturbances,  the  hypothesis  implies  that  forecast  errors  are
uncorrelated to the information set and have mean zero.
Earlier  studies of CM  forecasts confirmed  the presence  of
biases in the forecast errors. In this section we only investigate
whether  forecast biases  are  present  in  the  data  set;  for  the
purpose of comparison, forecast biases  implied by the commodity
futures  prices are also shown. Let ft  be the logarithm of the price
in period t of a futures  contract maturing in t+l. Then, the errors
4of the CM forecasts and f'tures  prices are measured, respectively,
by  Etpt+ , - pt.,  and  f,,  - pt+.  Table  3  shows  the  mean  percentage
errors  and their statistical significance.
Although the mean percentage  forecast errors are large  for
both the CM  forecasts and the futures prices, they  are all not
statistically different  from zero because of the large standard
deviation associated  with  them. The  standard deviations  of the
forecast errors are large mostly because the actual and forecasted
price changes  (Table 2) are large.  In 6 out of 10 commodities,
standard errors of futures price forecast errors are larger than
those of CM forecasts, but the differences are relatively minor.
It can be seen that the CM forecasts  have larger  absolute mean
forecast  errors than the futures  prices for  all commodities  except
coffee. The CM forecasts on average also show an overestimation
bias compared with the futures prices. The mean forecast error of
CM forecasts is positive in 8 out of 10 commodities, compared with
6  out  of  10 for  futures prices; they  are  also  larger  for all
commodities except for aluminum. For all commodities except cotton
and wheat, the direction of CM forecast bias matches that of the
futures prices, indicating that both share common information.
Both CM forecasts and futures prices failed to anticipate the
severity of the commodity price depressions in the 3981-86  period.
This failure was mainly responsible for the large upward biases in
Table 3: Errors of CM Forecasts and  -utures  Prices
(Percent  per annum)
CM Forecasts  Futures Prices
Commodities  Mean  S.D.  t-Ratio  Mean  S.D.  t-Ratio
Copper  10.5  35.3  0.30  2.9  27.0  0.11
Sugar  20.8  56.1  0.37  10.7  68.2  0.16
Coffee  -1.2  19.2  -0.06  -10.6  24.7  -0.53
Cocoa  10.0  19.5  0.53  7.9  15.7  0.49
Maize  17.6  21.3  0.84  10.5  20.1  0.53
Cotton  14.3  24.8  0.57  -1.6  29.4  -0.06
Wheat  5.1  11.3  0.46  -1.6  20.5  -0.08
Soybean  8.6  19.8  0.43  3.9  19.9  0.20
Aluminuma  -6.6  33.6  -0.18  -1.2  27.0  -0.04
Crude  Oila  23.9  31.9  0.75  5.8  41.3  0.14
a  Calculated from 1985-88 data.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank
5forecast errors. Nor did they anticipate the extent of the post-
1987  price  recovery,  resulting  in  underestimation  of  expected
prices  for that period. However,  it would appear  from the mean
forecast errors that the futures prices are informationally more
efficient than CM forecasts.2
III. FORMATION OF COMMODITY PRICE FORECASTS
The CM forecasts are made by individual commodity specialists
under given macroeconomic assumptions adopted by the institution
for  planning purposes, including assumptions about sconomic growth
and  inflation;  they  are  thus  conditional  forecasts.  Since  the
forecasts are  finalized only after peer  reviews, they  are also
consensus  forecasts.  In  short,  the  CM  forecasts  are  more
institutional in character  than  most  other  expectational  data,
which  are  basically  forecasts  made  by  individuals.  In  the
subsequent  analysis,  we  discuss  the  implications  of  this
characteristic for the estimation results.
Various models of expectations formation have been estimated
with expectational data.  In this section, following Frankel and
Froot,  we estimate three standard models of expectations formation
with  the CM data  --  the extrapolative, adaptive and regressive
models. The null hypothesis against which these models are tested
is the static  expectations model,  i.e., that  the  forecasts are
completely random around the current spot price.
ExtraRolative Expectations
The extrapolative model states that the agent's expectations
are arrived at by extrapolating the recent market trend. Thus, if
the price has been rising, it is  expected to rise further, and vice
versa. This "bandwagon" behavior may be represented by
Etpt,+  - Pt =  c1 + p,  (Pt  Pt-1),  (1)
where  the  maintained  hypothesis  is  Al  >  0  against  the  null
hypothesis (static expectations) that p1 =  0. Age'its  could expect
2  A statistical test of this proposition  is made difficult
because of the "peso problem," which arises when there is a small
probability of large changes. Such possibilities abound in  the case
of  primary  commodity  prices.  Adverse  weather,  labor  strikes,
changes in market structure due to collapse of producer cartels,
and demand  fluctuations are known to have caused wide swings  in
commodity prices, sometimes violating thL normality assumption in
their probability distribution.
6p:ices to decline when it has risen recently, which will be the
case  if 8  <  0. The  equation  (1) then becomes  equivalent  to a
simple form of distributed lag expectations:
Etpt+i  =  (1+01)  Pt - P  Pt-1.
The  slope  parameter  p1 repres.-ats  the  elasticity  of
expectations  with  respect  to  the  current  spot  price.  If  its
absolute value  is less than one, then expectations are inelastic
or stabilizing.
The extrapolative model  in (1) is estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS)  under the assumption that the error term added
to  it represents  the random measurement  error  and therefore  is
white  noise.  The  OLS  requirements will  be  violated  if the  CM
forecasts  affect  the  current  spot  price  or  the  error  term  is
autocorrelated. Since the CM forecasts are intended for the WoLld
Bank's internal use for purposes other than commodity trading, we
assume  that  there  is little  danger  of simultaneity between  the
forecasts and spot prices. Table 4 reports the estimation results.
It is interesting to note that the estimates of A,  are all
negative, strongly rejecting the bandwagon behavior  in favor of
the distributed lag expectations. In half of the 10 commoditics,
the estimates of 01  are significantly different from zero at the 5%
level or better, implying that the CM forecasts are not static.
Their absolute values are all less than one, meaning that the CM
forecasts are of the stabilizing kind. For example, a  10% price
increase in the current period  leads the CM to forecast a  2-6%
decline for the next period.
If variables other than the latest price change also affect
CM forecasts and they are autocorrelated in totality, the model in
(1)  may have the serial correlation problem in the error term. The
Durbin-Watson statistics in Table 4 suggest the presence of first-
order serial correlation for  -. t least seven of the commodities.
Mankiw  and  Shapiro  (1986) 'i  Ave  shown  that  the  asymptotic  test
statistics can lead to rejection of the true model  (in our case,
the static expectations  model)  too frequently  when the time series
is highly autocorrelated and the sample size is small. Since, in
the case of the model  in equation  (1), the independent variable
(percent  change in spot price) is not "highly"  autocorrelated,3 the
For  most  of  the  commodities,  the  autocorrelation
coefficient of the percentage change in spot price is estimated in
the 0.1-0.6 range, way below the minimum of 0.9 used in the Mankiw
and  Shapiro  Monte  Carlo  simulations.  For  the  adaptive  and
regressive expectational models, the autocorrelation coefficients
of the independent variables are estimated, respectively, in the
range of 0.3-0.7 and 0.2-0.6,  which also do not qualify as "highly"
autocorrelated.
7t-test results in Table 4 probably are still mostly valid.
As an additional safeguard, the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is
used for the commodities with low Durbin-Watson statistics to see
If the rejection of the null hypcthesis could have been due to a
serial correlation bias. The  correction for AR(1)  significantly
improves the Durbin-Watson statistic for sugar and coffee but does
not significantly change  the t-test results for the null hypothesis
Table 4: Extrapolative Expectations
Commodities  al  P  t:P 1-0  D-W  R**2
Aluminum  0.195  -0.30  -3.25**  1.31  0.58
(0.052)  (0.194)
Copper  0.169  -0.573  -1.67  1.26  0.20
(0.069)  (0.343)
Sugar  0.266  -0.360  -2.80*  0.70  0.49
(0.011)  (0.129)
with AR(1)  0.460  -0.211  -2.44*  2.25  0.14
correction  (0.128)  (0.086)
Coffee  0.064  -0.377  -5.17**  0.78  0.79
(0.017)  (0.073)
with AR(l)  0.043  -0.377  -8.90**  2.56  0.90
correction  (0.024)  (0.042)
Cocoa  0.027  -0.429  -2.31*  1.10  0.38
(0.043)  (0.186)
with AR(l)  -0.031  -0.130  -0.86  2.02  0.55
correction  (0.063)  (0.150)
Cotton  0.121  -0.297  -8.29**  1.47  0.91
(0.014)  (0.036)
Maize  0.114  -0.219  -0.86  1.70  -0.04
(0.048)  (0.219)
Wheat  0.056  -0.172  -0.74  1.70  -0.07
(0.044)  (0.231)
Soybean  0.095  -0.353  -1.43  1.50  0.13
(0.026)  (0.247)
Crude Oil  0.127  -0.306  -3.66**  1.17  0.64
(0.042)  (0.083)
Notes:  OLS  and  Cochrane-Orcutt  standard  errors  are  shown  in
parentheses.
*  Singificant at 5% level.
**  Significant  at 1% level.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
8--  the static expectations hypothesis is rejected with or without
AR(l) correction. For  aluminum, copper,  cotton, soybeans, and crude
oil, the serial  correlation  correction neither improved  the Durbin-
Watson  statistic  nor  changed  the  t-test  results.  For  these
commodities,  the low Durbin-Watson  statistics  resulted from  reasons
other than  first-order  autocorrelation.  Cocoa is  the only commoct.ty
for  which the t-test results changed from significant rejection to
non-rejection after AR(1) correction. Overall, serial correlation
does not appear  to have seriously biased the  estimates towards
rejection of the static expectations hypothesis.
Adaptive ExDectations
The  adaptive  expectations  model  has  been  widely  used  in
various dynamic economic  models. It  states that agents update their
expectations in  view of the latest information;  more specifically,
the expected price in  the next period is a weighted average of the
current spot  price and the price that was expected to prevail in
the current period:
Etpt. =  (1-02) Pt +  02  EtlPtl  (2)
where  stability of  expectations  requires that  0  <  02 <  1.  By
rearranging the terms and adding a constant term:
Etpt+1  - Pt =  a2 +  2  (Et-lpt  - Pt)-  (3)
OLS estimates  of  (3) are reported in Table  5, together with
those of AR(1) correction for some of the commodities. Overall, it
is clear  that  the  adaptive  expectations model  explains  the  CM
forecasts much  better  than the  extrapolative  (distributed lag)
model. In fact, as will be seen subsequently, the adaptive model
yields  the  best  fit  among  the  three  models.  This  result  is
significant  in view  of Muth's  (1960) proof  that when  commodity
price innovations are white noise processes, expectations formed
adaptively are minimum error variance  (rational) forecasts. The
estimates of p2 are all positive and  significantly greater than
zero except for wheat, soybeans and maize. They are all less than
unity to meet the stability requirement.
More  importantly,  the  estimates  of  02 are  quite  large,
exceeding 0.5 for many commodities and thus strongly rejecting the
static  expectations  hypothesis for  CM forecasts.  Again, this result
does  not  appear  to  be  significantly  influenced  by  serial
correlation of the residuals. Here, the Durbin-Watson statistics
are generally higher than in the extrapolative model. Even when
they are low, AR(1) correction either does not affect the result
too much and therefore not reported in  Table 5 (aluminum  and sugar)
--  the  null  hypothesis  is  still  rejected  --  or  the  estimate  of
first-order  serial  correlation  coefficient  is  not  significant
(copper  and coffee).
9The estimates Of 02  above are in sharp contrast to those of
other  studies, usually  less than  0.1  - 0.2  for  the  survey  of
exchange rate expc cations  reported in Frankel and Froot and stock
price expectations studied by Dokko and Edelstein. This confirms
the  earlier  findings by  Castelli et al.  that  the  CM  forecasts
attach  heavy weight to previous forecasts, probably excessively.
The rationalitv of this behavior will be discussed  in the next
section.
Table 5: Adaptive Expectations
a2 2  t:02=0  D-W  R**2
Aluminum  0.058  0.710  5.82**  1.24  0.82
(0.041)  (0.122)
with AR(1)  0.041  0.755  5.93**  1.61  0.84
correction  (0.064)  (0.127)
Copper  0.057  0.596  3.12*  1.44  0.55
(0.065)  (0.191)
Sugar  0.140  0.490  4.30**  0.84  0.71
(0.088)  (0.114)
with AR(1)  0.313  0.298  2.07*  1.54  0.21
correction  (0.131)  (0.144)
Coffee  0.048  0.420  3.81**  1.14  0.66
(0.023)  (0.110)
Cocoa  -0.001  0.421  3.95**  2.32  0.68
(0.033)  (0.106)
Cotton  0.070  0.335  7.06**  2.02  0.87
(0.033)  (0.048)
Maize  0.060  0.328  1.32  2.52  0.10
(0.066)  (0.248)
Wheat  0.013  0.516  1.49  1.78  0.15
(0.050)  (0.346)
Soybeans  0.088  0.180  1 28  1.75  0.08
(0.030)  (0.140)
Crude Oil  0.093  0.313  3.11*  1.62  0.55
(0.048)  (0.101)
Notes: See Table 4.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
Regressive ExRectations
The regressive expectations model is based on the hypothesis
that prices tend to converge to their long-run equilibrium values.
Agents,  therefore,  expect  prices  to  return  to  their  long-term
10levels  whenever the current spot prices  deviate from them. A simple
version of this hypothesis may be written as:
Etpt.,  =  (l1-)Pt +  yp*t,  (4)
where p*t is the long-run equilibrium price. The higher the value
of 7,  the faster the adjustment of expectations to the long-run
equilibrium.
One  can  think  of different ways  of defining  the  long-run
equilibrium price.  The  simplest way  is to assume  that  it is a
constant, i.e., 7P*t =  a 3,  where a3 is  a constant. Then, rearranging
the terms in (4) gives:
Etpt+ 1 - Pt =  a 3 +  03Pt,  (5)
where 0 3 =  --. Results of estimating (5) are reported in Table 6.
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A more  realistic assumption about the long-term equilibrium
price is to posit that it changes over time in proportion to the
overall rate of inflation, i.e.,
P*t =  pc0 + log(It/I 0),  (6)
where pc 0 is the long-run equilibrium price in constant dollars of
the base period 0 and I.  is the index of inflation. For the purpose
of estimation, we measure pc 0 by the average constant-dollar prices
during the 1970-79  period. Inflation is  measured by the unit value
of manufactured exports from industrial to developing countries;
this  is  the  inflation  assumption  used  in  arriving  at  the  CM
forecasts. By substituting (6) into (4)  and rearranging terms, we
get:
Etpt-l  - Pt =  14  +  p4 (Pt - P*)  ,  (7)
where p  =  --. Table 7 presents the results of estimating (7).
Results in Tables 6 and 7 are not much different from each
other. Both indicate that the CM forecasts tend to converge to
long-term equilibrium  prices.  In 8  out  of  the  10 commodities,
including those with serial correlation correction, the estimates
of  the slope coefficient are significantly  different from zero. For
copper,  cocoa and wheat, AR(l) correction enhances the power of the
t-test. The estimates of 7  are all positive and fall between zero
and one, implying that the CM forecasts  are stabilizing. The weight
for the long-term price ranges between 0.4 and 0.7 in many cases,
which is  considerably larger  than the estimate by Frankel and Froot
of about 0.25 from annual survey data. Again, the CM forecasts are
less  adaptive to the current spot price and tend to converge faster
to the long-term level than other survey forecasts.
11Table  6: Regressive  Expectations  I
C13  03  t:  1 3=0  D-W  R**2
Aluminum  6.665  -0.900  -3.84**  0.74  0.63
(1.692)  (0.234)
Copper  4.557  -0.597  -1.43  0.58  0.12
(3.084)  (0.417)
with  AR(1)  4.779  -0.633  -1.87  1.02  0.41
correction  (2.484)  (0.339)
Sugar  2.579  -0.442  -4.18**  1.72  0.67
(0-554)  (0.106)
Coffee  3.761  -0.652  -4.16**  1.97  0.67
(0.889)  (0.156)
Cocoa  0.829  -0.143  -0.61  0.61  -0.08
(1.259)  (0.234)
with  AR(1)  2.158  -0.409  -2.08*  2.30  0.59
correction  (1.029)  (0.196)
Cotton  1.526  -0.276  -2.35*  1.21  0.36
(0.598)  (0.117)
with  AR(1)  2.212  -0.442  -5.56**  2.12  0.60
correction  (0.449)  (0.080)
Maize  1.379  -0.259  -1.33  1.43  0.90
(0.926)  (0.195)
Wheat  1.767  -0.330  -1.09  0.95  0.02
(1.539)  (0.302)
with  AR(1)  3.280  -0.639  -3.01*  1.55  0.28
correction  (1.084)  (0.213)
SoyVieans  0.414  -0.059  -0.25  1.11  -0.13
(1.328)  (0.239)
Crude  Oil  1.027  -0.295  -2.08*  1.84  0.29
(0.452)  (0.142)
Notes:  See Table  4.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
To summarize,  among  the  three  expectational  models  estimated
above,  the  adaptive  expectations  model  appears  to  most  closely
approximate  the  expectational  behavior  of  CM  forecasters.  This
contrasts  with  the  Frankel  and  Froot  result  where  the  distributed
lag model  produced  the best estimates.  Of course,  more  complicated
models  could  have produced  a better  fit, but the small  sample  size
rules  out  such  an opportunity.
12Table 7: Regressive Expections II
a,4  04  t:  104=0  D-W  R**2
Aluminum  0.103  -0.783  -2.67*  0.46  0.43
(0.061)  (0.293)
with AR(1)  -0.332  -0.992  -6.42**  1.33  0.78
correction  (0.507)  (0.154)
Copper  -0.028  -0.300  -0.77  0.58  -0.05
(0.233)  (0.387)
with AR(1)  -1.311  -0.671  -2.23*  1.29  0.42
corr-^tion  (1.577)  (0.301)
Sugar  -0.030  -0.441  -4.43**  1.78  0.70
(0.103)  (0.100)
Coffee  -0.056  -0.490  -4.21**  1.87  0.68
(0.346)  (0.116)
Cocoa  0.034  -0.132  -0.72  0.58  -0.06
(0.056)  (0.183)
with AR(1)  -0.145  -0.383  -2.65*  2.47  0.67
correction  (0.124)  (0.144)
Cotton  0.071  -0.178  -1.44  1.55  0.12
(0.052)  (0.123)
Maize  0.082  -0.182  -1.23  1.42  0.06
(0.072)  (0.148)
Wheat  0.043  -0.134  -0.57  1.23  -0.09
(0.088)  (0.234)
with AR(1)  -0.270  -0.598  -3.06*  1.77  0.23
correction  (0.179)  (0.195)
Soybeans  0.063  -0.055  -0.33  1.10  -0.13
(0.075)  (0.168)
Crude Oil  0.284  -0.269  -2.17*  1.90  0.32
(0.104)  (0.124)
Notes: See Table 4.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
IV. RATIONALITY OF CM FORECASTS
Have the CM commodity price  forecasts been rational?  This
question  can  be  answered  by  comparing  the  exrectional  models
estimated  above with  the  spot price  behavior.  One  of the main
findings above was that the CM forecasts  do not adapt to spot price
changes as fast as others (as  reflected in futures  prices). One way
of  judging  whether  this  particular  characteristic  of  the  CM
forecasts  was  justified  is  to  compare  the  parameters  o0  the
expectational model and the spot price process. This information
could be useful in improving  the accuracy of the CM forecasts. The
13comparison amounts to tests of the rationality of CM expectations.
It  was  noted  previously  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  rational
expectations  imply  mean  zero  and  serially  uncorrelated
expectational errors.
We postulate that the spot price process can be described  by
the  same  functional  form  as  the  expectational  model  under
consideration.  In  the  case  of  extrapolative  expectations,  for
example,  it  is  assumed  that  the  spot  price  process  can  be
represented by:
Pt+1  - Pt =  a1 +  b, (pt - pt-1),  (8)
where  the  parameters  are  subject  to  the  same  constraints  for
stability as in (1). Subtracting (8) from (1):
Etpt+l  -Pt+l  =  (a,-a,)  +  (f1 -bl) (Pt  - Pt-1).  (9)
The null hypothesis of rational expectations implies al-al  =  -b
=  0. Results of estimating (9)  with OLS appear in Table 8.
The F-test statistics in  Table 8  show that the null hypothesis
of rationality cannot be rejected for all the commodities at the
usual significance level. The null hypothesis is rejected at the
15% level for two commodities (aluminum  and cocoa). Again, none of
the slope coefficients are significant at the usual significance
level, indicating that the CM forecasts cannot be considered to
have been irrational.  The Mankiw and Shapiro considerations in the
context  of  small  samples  strengthen  the  non-rejection  of
rationality,  although  the difference  in the  power  of the  test
statistics  would  have  been  small  because  of  the  lack  of  high
autocorrelation.
In  four  of  the  commodities,  the  slope  is  significantly
different from zero at the 15% level. In six of the commodities,
the estimates of the slope coefficient are positive, meaning the
CM forecasts overestimated the tendency for the spot price to move
in the same direction as in the recent past. In the remaining four
commodities, the CM forecasts underestimated the tendency. In any
case,  the degree  of overestimation  or underestimation  is quite
large  for all  commodities  except  maize,  although  they  are  not
statistically significant because of  large standard errors. The
intercept  coefficients  are  all  positive  and  most  of  them  are
significant only at the 15% level, indicating that the CM forecasts
have apparently been biased upward.
Estimates of the adaptive expectation model showed that the
CM forecasters placed a heavy weight on the previous forecasts. Is
this rational?  We proceed as before and assume that the true model
for the spot price process is described by:
P+1 - Pt =  a2 +  b2 (Et-,pt  - pt)  (10)
14Table  8: Rationality  of Extrapolative  Expectations
t:  F-test
a,-a,  fl1-bl  Pl-bl=o  D-W  R**2  a1-a1 =0
61-b1 =O
Aluminum  0.139  0.713  1.93*  1.39  0.28  3.74*
(0.099)  (0.369)
Copper  0.126  0.524  0.80  1.26  -0.05  0.64
(0.133)  (0.655)
Sugar  0.347  0.118  0.72  1.71  -0.07  0.52
(0.140)  (0.164)
Coffee  0.030  -0.378  -1.41*  2.07  0.12  1.99
(0.062)  (0.268)
Cocoa  0.044  0.443  1.69*  1.65  0.21  2.85*
(0.060)  (0.262)
Cotton  0.162  -0.182  -0.73  2.15  -0.07  0.54
(0.094)  (0.249)
Maize  0.163  0.079  0.16  2.17  -0.16  0.03
(0.090)  (0.479)
Wheat  0.060  -0.281  -1.29*  1.11  0.09  1.67
(0.041)  (0.217)
Soybeans  0.089  0.535  0.72  0.90  -0.07  0.52
(0.078)  (0.741)
Crude  Oil  0.185  -0.121  -0.73  2.49  -0.07  0.53
(0.084)  (0.166)
*  Significant  at 15%.
Source:  International  Economics  Department,  World  Bank.
Subtraction  of  (10) from  (3) yields:
Etpt+ 1 - Pt+1  =  (a 2-a2)  +  (02-b2)  (Et  - p)  (11)
Equation  (11) expresses forecast errors as a linear  function of
their  lagged  value.  A  test  of  the  rationality  of  adaptive
expectations, therefore, amounts to a test of serial correlation
in  the forecast error.  The null hypothesis of rational expectations
implies a2-a 2 =  j3 2-b 2 =  0. Estimation results of equation  (11) are
shown in Table 9.
F-test  results  show  that  the  null  hypothesis  cannot  be
rejected at the usual significance level; it can be rejected at
the 15% level only  for coffee. The non-rejection result here is
somewhat stronger than in the case of extrapolative expectations,
probably because adaptive behavior approximates the reality more
closely than the distributed lag representation. None of the slope
15Table 9: Rationality of Adaptive Expectations
t:  F test
a2-a2  02-b2 02-b 2=0  D-W  R**2  a2-a 2=0
102-b2=0
Aluminum  0.026  0.581  1.48*  1.21  0.15  2.20
(0.130)  (0.392)
Copper  0.009  0.613  1.37*  1.50  0.11  1.87
(0.153)  (0.448)
Sugar  0.341  0.037  0.18  1.64  -0.16  0.03
(0.160)  (0.201)
Coffee  0.055  -0.538  -1.81*  1.92  0.24  3.27*
(0.061)  (0.298)
Cocoa  0.032  0.300  1.36*  1.33  0.11  1.85
(0.068)  (0.220)
Cotton  0.204  -0.292  -1.07  1.97  0.02  1.15
(0.096)  (0.272)
Maize  0.270  -0.502  -1.09  2.16  0.03  1.19
(0.122)  (0.460)
Wheat  0.054  0.002  0.006  0.73  -0.17  0.00
(0.059)  (0.412)
Soybeans  0.096  0.121  0.29  1.01  -0.15  0.08
(0.091)  (0.424)
Crude Oil  0.194  -0.081  -0.44  2.66  -0.13  0.19
(0.089)  (0.184)
Notes: See Table 8.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
terms  are  significant  at  5%;  only  at  the  15%  level,  do  four
commodities  show  significant  slopes.
Although  statistically  not  significant,  the  slope  term  is
estimated  to  be  quite  large  in  at  least  seven  commodities,  which
may  be  grounds  for  suspecting  the  presence  of  serial  correlation
in forecast errors. In six of the ten commodities, the coefficient
is positive; for these commodities, the  forecaster attaches too
much weight to the previous forecast and, therefore, can improve
the forecast by shifting the weight more to the current spot price.
This is  in  sharp contrast to the findings  by Frankel and Froot that
most exchange rate forecasters  surveyed adapt too fast to spot rate
changes.  In  four  of  the  commodities  with  a  negative  slope
coefficient, the opposite holds.
The intercept terms are not significantly different from zero
for six of the commodities; for these commodities, forecast errors
arise not because of unconditional bias but  because either  too
16little or too much attention is given to the previous forecasts.
Even when the intercept is significant, its size is smaller than
in the case of extrapolative expectations.
Following the same method, we now test the rationality of the
regressive  expectation  estimates. The forecast  errors are regressed
on pt and pt - p*,, respectively, and the  results are shown  in
Tables 10  and 11.  For both versions of regressive expectations, the
null hypothesis of rational expectations is rejected only for
cotton  and wheat.  For both  of these  commodities, significantly
positive slope coefficients indicate  that actual spot prices  tended
to converge to the long-term equilibrium levels much faster than
the CM forecasts. In version I, the slope coefficients are all
positive except for the metals, implying  that the CM forecasts can
be improved by converging to the long-term prices more rapidly. In
version  II, the  same  recommendation applies to  all  commodities
except aluminum. For copper and aluminum, it was shown in Tables
6 and 7 that the CM forecasts put high weight  (60% to 90%) on the
long-run price. These are found to be excessive.
Table 10: Rationality of Regressive Expectations I
t:  _  F-test
a3-a 3 f33-b 3 03-b 3=0  D-W  R**2  a3-a 3=0
63-b3=0
Aluminum  3.716  -0.500  -0.92  1.02  -0.02  0.84
(3.939)  (0.545)
Copper  1.294  -0.161  -0.22  0.77  -0.13  0.05
(5.433)  (0.735)
Sugar  -0.767  0.188  0.71  0.94  -0.07  0.51
(1.378)  (0.263)
Coffee  -3.174  0.557  1.26  2.31  0.07  1.59
(2.505)  (0.441)
Cocoa  -2.105  0.410  1.39  0.83  0.10  1.93
(1.587)  (0.295)
Cotton  -2.756  0.570  2.32*  1.82  0.35  5.36*
(1.587)  (0.295)
Maize  -1.214  0.293  0.94  2.31  -0.02  0.88
(1.485)  (0.313)
Wheat  -3.074  0.613  4.30**  1.71  0.69  18.48**
(0.727)  (0.143)
Soybeans  -2.988  0.553  1.35  1.34  0.09  1.83
(2.272)  (0.409)
Crude Oil  -0.737  0.263  0.91  1.02  -0.02  0.84
(0.915)  (0.288)
Notes: See Table 4.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
17Table 11: Rationality of Regressive Expectations II
t:  _  F test
a.-a.  P4-b 4 Pi3-b4=0  D-W  R**2  a4-a`=0
P4-b4=0
Aluminum  0.098  -0.101  -0.17  0.85  -0.14  0.03
(0.121)  (0.579)
Copper  0.291  0.327  0.53  0.73  -0.10  0.28
(0.369)  (0.615)
Sugar  0.330  0.170  0.65  0.96  -0.08  0.43
(0.270)  (0.260)
Coffee  0.015  0.116  0.32  2.85  -0.13  0.10
(0.108)  (0.363)
Cocoa  0.122  0.234  0.92  0.81  -0.02  0.85
(0.070)  (0.253)
Cotton  0.296  0.526  2.44*  1.80  0.38  5.96*
(0.090)  (0.215)
Maize  0.263  0.230  0.99  2.34  -0.003  0.98
(0.114)  (0.233)
Wheat  0.191  0.440  4.03**  1.76  0.66  16.23**
(0.041)  (0.109)
Soybeans  0.259  0.448  1.62  1.44  0.17  2.63
(0.123)  (0.276)
Crude Oil  -0.029  0.173  0.66  1.16  -0.07  0.44
(0.219)  (0.262)
Notes: See Table 4.
Source: International Economics Department, World Bank.
Finally, most of the intercept terms are not  significantly
different  from  zero  --  the  regressive  forecasts  are  not
unconditionally biased.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzed CM's short-term commodity price forecasts
with standard expectational models. The results appear to be the
following:
(1)  The one year-ahead CM forecasts for the period 1979-88
on average have shown positive forecast errors (overestimated the
future  spot prices) which are often larger than the forecast errors
of futures prices. This overforecasting may be partly due to the
extended period of low commodity prices in the 1980s.
18(2)  Among the expectational models estimated, the adaptive
expectations model  appears to describe the CM forecast behavior
most closely. This form of expectations probably makes  the most
sense as a short-term forecasting strategy.
(3)  CM  forecasts  are  stabilizing,  regardless  of  the
expectational  model  used.  There  are  no  indications  of  any
"bandwagon" behavior;  actually,  CM  forecasts tend  to  put  less
emphasis on the latest price developments than those studied by
others.
(4)  The CM forecasts are far from static  in that they put
much smaller weight on the current spot price than found in other
studies.  Factors other than  the  current spot price  --  such  as
lagged spot price, previous forecasts, and long-term equilibrium
price used in this study --  weigh more heavily in CM forecasts than
in others. In other words, the CM forecasts are not as adaptive to
the latest price changes as others.
(5) The characteristic of CM forecasts described in (4)  above
is probably  less  than  desirable;  CM  short-term  forecasts,  can
benefit  by  more  readily  adapting  to  the  most  recent  price
developments.  However,  statistical  tests  show  that  this
characteristic  cannot  be  branded  as  irrational.  This  lack  of
rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis contradicts the
results  of  previous  studies  of  these  forecasts  that  strongly
rejected the hypothesis. Considerations of the small sample size
and  the autocorrelation in  the explanatory  variables strengthen the
non-rejection result.
The  above findi gs seem robust despite apparent caveats. The
non-rejection  of  ra ionality  is  stronger  than  what  the  test
statistics suggest because much of the over-prediction during the
early 1980s can be attributed to the notion of a regime change, a
concept that Lewis formally introduced to explain forecast errors.
Lewis  found  that  about half  of  the  forecast errors  implied by
foreign exchange futures could be attributed to the time it took
agents to recognize and adapt to changes in  US money demand. During
the period under study here, there have been a numiber  of important
changes  in  the  commodity  markets.  First,  the  macroeconomic
assumptions on which the commodity price forecasts have been based
were slow to recognize the severity and duration of the 1982-85
recession. Institutional  rigidities may have played a  part in this.
Secondly, the market structure has changed to a more competitive
environment; the most notable is the gradual weakening of the OPEC
oil cartel. Thirdly, the demand growth for metals slowed down to
such an extent that structural change was widely conjectured to be
its cause. These are just a  few of the major  changes that have
affected  commodity  prices.  Because  of  the  diversity  of  these
changes, some specific to each commodity, it is  difficult to assess
their impact on the CM forecast errors, a la Lewis. Even without
going through an analysis, however, it  can safely  be concluded that
19taking the regime changes into consideration will strengthen the
non-rejection of rationality of CM forecasts.
There is a trade-off in giving more weight to current spot
price movements, however. In its extreme form, this is equivalent
to the proposition that commodity prices are martingales and thus
unpredictable. However, this proposition has generally been deemed
applicable to the very short term, such as day-to-day or weekly
price  movements,  but  not  for a  forecast horizon  of  a  year  or
longer. The CM forecasts are based oih  the premise that prices over
a year's  horizon  are predictable; an  independent assessment  of
market fundamentals  would be more desirable than taking the static
approach if the institution  has certain informational advantages.
In the case of the World Bank, a clear advantage is its global
network of operation. As shown at the beginning of this paper, the
CM  forecasts  have  been  more  successful  in  predicting  market
turnarounds and sharp price changes than static expectations or
futures prices. Thus,  adapting  too closely  to  spot  or  futures
prices  is  probably  informationally  inefficient  from  the
institution's standpoint.
In  conclusion, CM forecasts  with significant  but not excessive
adaptation to spot price movements probably offer a reasonable and
optimal  short-term  forecasting  s-rategy,  superior  to  "naive"
forecasts or futures prices.
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